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1. Introduction 
 
One of the central problems of constitutionalism is how to establish and 
simultaneously control a government. As James Madison famously put it in Federalist 51 
“you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place 
oblige it to control itself” (The Federalist 51, 1788). Many familiar constitutional features 
are tools to oblige government to act in the people’s interest; the establishment of 
frequent elections is, perhaps, the most famous example.  
Democratic constitutional features, like frequent elections, are widely compared 
to the rules of a game and described as the framework upon which a government is built. 
In order to maintain, not merely establish, a democratic polity, however, a good set of 
rules is, on its own, insufficient. If members of government, or the temporary majorities 
whom they represent, can subvert the very mechanisms designed to keep them in check, 
they can exceed the constitutional bounds on their authority without repercussions, and 
change the game entirely. Those who conceptualize constitutionalism as a form of 
contracting often refer to this risk as the principal-agent problem (Ginsburg & Posner 
2011). In employing an agent (or creating a representative government), the principal (or 
people) will need to ensure that the agent acts in the principal’s best interest, and not in 
its own interest at the expense of the principal. Thus, principals must carefully monitor 
their agents. The costs associated with this monitoring activity are known as agency 
costs. 
Constitutional theorists have arrived at a near-universal solution to the problem of 
agency costs: entrenchment. In order for a constitution to create a democratic system that 
will remain democratic, they reason, the constitution’s authors must not only erect a 
framework of government, but must also ensure the stability of that framework, 
entrenching it to protect it from the very people it will empower (Levinson 2011). Indeed, 
this entrenchment imperative, or the act of long-term commitment, is generally 
understood as central to the entire constitutional endeavor. Constitutions, therefore, are 
generally distinguished from ordinary law by their higher degree of formal entrenchment. 
Indeed, enhanced entrenchment is not only the hallmark of formal constitutional 
documents, but also of the set of legal policies and practices that define a nation’s 
informal, or “small-c” constitution (Eskridge & Ferejohn 2011; Levinson 2011, 701). 
“Exceptional legal entrenchment” is not only taken to be the defining feature of 
constitutions but is often described as their raison d’etre (Holmes 1995, 132-78).  In fact, 
the origins of modern constitutionalism are generally attributed to monarchs or other elite 
rulers that attempted to make their commitments more credible by entrenching them. 
These elites developed constitutionalism as way to entrench the concessions they were 
forced to make to maintain the support of essential members of their political coalitions 
(North & Weingast 1989; Acemoglu & Robinson 2001). 
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The entrenchment imperative discourages the constitutionalization of highly 
specific policy choices, since specific policies are unlikely to remain appropriate and/or 
popular in the face of changing economic and social conditions.  Indeed, James Madison 
argued that because a constitution is written for the ages to come, it can contain only 
general principles, and ought to omit unnecessary detail (Hammons 1999). Another 
reason that entrenchment works against constitutional specificity is that it is generally 
more challenging for diverse groups to agree on particular details than on broad standards 
or principles (Hardin 1999, 84), and we might expect this difficulty to be heightened if 
those agreements will be difficult to revise.  The knowledge that a bargain’s outcome will 
be highly entrenched, therefore, might well render ambiguity necessary to achieve 
consensus.  Indeed, we have come to think of constitutions not only as entrenched, but 
also as spare, ambiguous frameworks of government.  According to Andre Marmor 
(2007, 91-94), for instance, generality/abstraction is one of the six main features of 
written constitutions (along with longevity, rigidity, and judicial review, amongst others). 
An independent judiciary with the power of judicial review is often seen as 
central to the project of constitutional entrenchment (Levinson 2011, 661). Constitutions 
render bargains credible in part because they enable courts to enforce the terms of those 
bargains if any party attempts to violate them (North and Weingast 1989).. Tom Ginsburg 
has described this phenomenon in new democracies that constitutionalize judicial review 
as a form of insurance, reassuring competing parties that even if they find themselves 
electoral losers, they will have a way to enforce the constitution against those who have 
won (Ginsburg 2003). Similarly, Ran Hirschl describes how constitutions can facilitate a 
process that he calls “hegemonic preservation,” whereby ruling elites protect the policies 
they have established from democratic majorities that might wish to change them by 
placing these policies directly into the constitution, and enabling courts to nullify any 
future legislature’s attempt to repeal them (Hirschl 2004). Those who conceptualize 
constitutional governance as the relationship between principal and agent explain that 
courts help to entrench the constitution by alerting the principal when the agent has 
overstepped its constitutional boundaries 
As Professors Ginsburg and Hirschl’s analyses suggest, constitutional projects 
devoted to entrenchment often invite the judiciary to play a sizable role in the 
policymaking process. After all, the less explicit and capacious the constitutional text is, 
the more discretion it will require to interpret and apply in new and changing 
circumstances.  In addition, where constitutional change is challenging to achieve 
through formal, textual amendment, it may be more likely to occur through judiciaries, 
employing interpretive and/or extra-textual means. Entrenched, general constitutions do 
not necessarily expand the judiciary’s discretion; we could imagine a system in which the 
judiciary was confined to answering only those constitutional questions with explicit 
textual answers, or one in which other branches or popular interpreters were free to 
interpret and apply the constitution with only minimal regard for the judiciary’s reading 
(Whittington 1999; Kramer 2004). Yet where norms of judicial supremacy govern 
constitutional interpretation, spare and rigid frameworks will endow the judiciary with 
remarkable room to make constitutional meaning.  In fact, when the meaning of highly 
entrenched constitutions does change, it is often because one political party or regime has 
succeeded in changing the composition of the constitutional court, rendering the court 
willing to redraw the constitutional boundaries it is responsible for policing (Balkin & 
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Levinson 2001; Gilman 2002). Thus, rigid framework constitutions are rigid at the level 
of their text, but not necessarily (and not likely) at the level of their actual meaning in 
either judicial doctrine or political practice.  
 
 
3. The Gap Between Constitutional Theory and Modern Practice 
 
The U.S. Constitution epitomizes the rigid, sparse framework that most of the 
constitutional literature describes. However, the vast majority of democratic 
constitutions, both within the United States and across the world, generally look very 
little like the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, most democratic constitutions are longer 
and less entrenched. In this section, we examine the length and revision rate of the 
constitutions of democratic polities, as well as the correlation between length and 
flexibility.  
Our sample consists of the constitutions of all democratic national constitutions as 
well as the constitutions of the American states. In our previous work, we have shown 
that national constitutions and state constitutions share much in common (Versteeg & 
Zackin 2013). We examine both state and national constitutions here because both 
illustrate the constitutional design logic that we seek to expose in this paper. Our analysis, 
however, does not depend on the pooling of state and national constitutions, and both the 
empirical impressions painted in this section and the theoretical implications discussed in 
the next section remain similar when state and national constitutions are examined 
separately. 
 
3.1 Constitutional Length 
 
The prevailing view of constitutionalism in the U.S. has tracked that of Justice 
Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, when he argued that “only [the Constitution’s] great 
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients 
which compose those objects be deducted from the nature of those objects themselves.” 
Anything else, Justice Marshall noted, would “partake a prolixity of a legal code” and 
would “never be understood by the public.”  (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 
316, 407 (1819)). Indeed, in its current form, the U.S. Constitution contains 7762 words, 
in seven original articles and twenty-seven amendments.   
Few other democratic constitutions fit Marshall’s famous prescription. For 
instance, most democratic constitutions are significantly longer.
1
  The average 
constitution comprises 20,992 words, which is about three times as many as the U.S. 
Constitution.  India’s constitution, at 146,385 words, is the world’s longest and almost 
twenty times the length of the U.S. Constitution. Nations with constitutions shorter than 
the U.S. Constitution include microstates like Luxembourg, Monaco, Micronesia, as well 
as a handful of dictatorial regimes that, by and large, lack any meaningful constitutional 
tradition, and that are not part of our analysis.  Setting these aside, only three other 
democratic nations have fundamental documents of comparable length to the U.S. 
Constitution: Norway’s 1814 constitution, Denmark’s 1953 constitution, and Japan’s 
1947 constitution (which was famously drafted by General McArthur after World War 
                                                        
1
 The data on the length of national constitutions comes from the Comparative Constitutions Project. 
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II).   The constitutions of the American states are comparable in length. The longest state 
constitution is that of Alabama, which at 340,136 words, is three times longer than the 
most verbose national constitution (India). Even the shortest state constitutions, those of 
New Hampshire and Vermont, are still longer than the federal Constitution.  On average, 
democratic constitutions contain 28,468 words (36,333 words for state constitutions and  
24, 371 words for the average national constitution).  
Two interrelated constitutional design features appear to be responsible for the 
length of the world’s constitutions and those of the U.S. states: their scope and detail 
(Ginsburg 2010).  By scope, we mean that most democratic constitutions deal with an 
expansive range of topics.  Both national and state constitutions cover topics such as 
fiscal policy and economic development, management of natural resources, and matters 
of cultural significance and citizen character. Indeed, the scope of constitutions has 
grown to such a degree that they now routinely cover topics far afield from fundamental 
rights and basic government structure. Louisiana’s constitution designates Huey Long’s 
birthday as a state holiday (La. Const. 1912, art. XIX, § 22) while Venezuela’s 
constitution references the “liberator Simón Bolívar” (Venezuela Const. 1999, pmbl) and 
the Turkish constitution makes sixteen explicit references to “Atatürk,” the nation’s 
“immortal leader and the unrivalled hero” (Turkey Const. 1982, pmbl).  In addition to 
these matters of political symbolism, both state constitutions and national constitutions 
enshrine a host of policy choices. The Alabama constitution deals with catfish, cattle, 
chickens, swine, sheep and goat, while the constitution of Nepal deals with cows and 
birds, the Swedish constitution provides for a right to reindeering, and a number of other 
national constitutions enshrine animal rights. Both state and national constitutions also 
contain detailed environmental regulations, as California’s Marine Resources Protection 
provisions, New York’s “Forever Wild” amendment, and Ecuador’s rights for pacha 
mama (nature) attest. 
Second, most democratic constitutions are characterized by substantial detail, 
using a large number of words to describe each of their provisions. For example, the 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution establishing the judicial branch—including its 
jurisdiction, the appointment and compensation of judges, and the institution of the jury 
trial—comprise 291 words (compare U.S. Const. art III, §§ 1–2 with Alabama Const. 
1901, arts. 5-6; Ecuador Const. 2008, tit. 4, ch.4). By contrast, the constitutions of 
Alabama and Ecuador each use almost 4000 words to establish their judicial branches. 
These provisions are longer than Article III of the U.S. Constitution not because the 
judicial branches in Alabama or Ecuador perform a wider range of tasks than their 
counterparts, but only because these provisions describe the judiciaries’ tasks in far 
greater detail. 
 
3.2 Revision Rate 
Not only are modern day democratic constitutions more capacious and detailed 
than the U.S. Constitution, they are substantially more flexible. Indeed, the U.S. 
Constitution has endured for over two centuries. By contrast, as Zachary Elkins, Tom 
Ginsburg and James Melton have demonstrated in a book length treatment on the subject, 
the median national constitution lasts nineteen years before it is replaced (Elkins at al. 
2009). We ourselves have shown that the median state constitution lasts forty-four years 
before it is replaced (Versteeg & Zackin 2013).  
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 Not only has the U.S. Constitution endured, the document has undergone textual 
changes only rarely, having been amended twenty-seven times, on seventeen different 
occasions. Thus, the changes in this document’s meaning have not come through 
wholesale re-thinking or revision, and certainly not through regular constitutional 
conventions. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution and the politics surrounding it are 
characterized by an unusual degree of concern for the document’s stability (Levinson 
2011). Other democratic constitutions are typically amended with much higher 
frequency. 
To capture the malleability of democratic constitutions, we calculate an annual 
revision rate, which captures constitutional changes that come about through wholesale 
replacement or amendment. Specifically, it is the total number of years in which a state or 
country witnessed constitutional change of some sort (either through replacement or 
amendment, regardless of how many amendments were passed that year), divided by the 
total number of years the state or country has existed.
2
   The measure deliberately does 
not distinguish between amendment and replacement, because that distinction is not 
always meaningful (Sturm 1970).  Some U.S. states, for example, have employed the 
formal amendment process to overhaul their entire constitutions, sometimes substituting 
packages of amendments for formal revision.  For instance, California passed 130 
amendments to its constitution in 1966, and South Carolina passed 200 amendments 
between 1971 and 1973.  Not only can constitutions be effectively replaced through the 
mechanism of amendment, the formal adoption of a new constitution does not always 
effect significant change in content.  For example, Louisiana’s 1861 constitution was 
exactly the same as the 1852 constitution, except for its replacing the words “United 
States” with “Confederate States” throughout.  This phenomenon is also common in 
fledgling national democracies, when a new leader formally adopts a “new” constitution 
that maintains most of the content of its predecessor (Elkins et al., at 22-23). The 
collective historical constitutions of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and 
Venezuelawhich together account for ten percent of all national constitutions ever 
writtenare essentially just variations on their predecessor documents; they were 
declared “new” constitutions only to mark changes in political leadership (Elkins et al., at 
57). 
The left-hand column of Table 1 list the top 30 most frequently revised 
democratic constitutions. This list is topped by India and Louisiana (which, 
coincidentally, have the same revision rates), followed by Texas, Austria, Norway, and 
Malaysia.  The top 30 least frequently revised are depicted in the right-hand column of 
Table 1.  The most stable national constitution is that of Japan, followed by the 
constitutions of the microstates of Nauru, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines.  The U.S. Constitution is among the most stable national constitutions. When 
excluding microstates, only the constitutions of Japan, Denmark, Paraguay, Cyprus and 
Vermont have been more insulated from change.   
 
                                                        
2
 This data comes from Dixon & Holden, and is available for 44 states.  
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Table 1: Top 30 most and least frequently revised democratic constitutions  
Highest revision rate 
 
Lowest revision rate 
 Louisiana 
India 
Texas 
Austria 
Norway 
Malaysia 
Malawi 
Mexico 
New York 
Oklahoma 
Kenya 
Virginia 
New Jersey 
South Carolina 
Colorado 
Malta 
New Mexico 
North Dakota 
Finland 
Russia 
Delaware 
Arizona 
Florida 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Bangladesh 
Moldova 
Ohio 
Georgia 
Oregon 
Senegal 
0.68 
0.68 
0.61 
0.59 
0.57 
0.56 
0.54 
0.51 
0.50 
0.49 
0.49 
0.49 
0.48 
0.47 
0.47 
0.46 
0.46 
0.45 
0.45 
0.45 
0.44 
0.44 
0.43 
0.42 
0.42 
0.42 
0.41 
0.41 
0.41 
0.41 
Japan 
Nauru 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent & Gren. 
Denmark 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Paraguay 
Cyprus 
Andorra 
Kiribati 
Micronesia 
Vermont 
Bahamas 
United States 
Australia 
Namibia 
Tuvalu 
Dominica 
Timor 
United Kingdom 
Palau 
Italy 
Liberia 
Mozambique 
Fiji 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Marshall Islands 
Grenada 
New Hampshire 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
0.09 
0.09 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.11 
0.11 
 
 
The average revision rate across all democratic polities 0.27, which means that 
average democratic constitution is revised roughly every three years.  The revision rate 
for U.S. state constitution is 0.35, which means that the states revise their constitutions 
about every three years. The average revision rate for democratic national constitutions is 
0.25, which means that democracies amend or replace their constitutions roughly every 
four years.  This is substantially more than the U.S. Constitution, which, with a revision 
rate of 0.07 is revised every 14 years on average. To be sure, this is not a measure of how 
meaningfully or substantially these constitutions have been altered, only a measure of 
people’s willingness to tinker with them. The word counts and revision rates presented 
above suggest that most democratic constitutions do get tinkered with fairly frequently 
and that they include not only the broad outlines of government, but also detailed policy 
provisions.  
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4. What Constitutions Really Do: An Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design 
 
 In order to understand why most democratic constitutions are neither particularly 
well entrenched nor exclusively broad frameworks, it is necessary to re-think 
entrenchment, viewing it not as an end or defining feature of constitutionalism, but as 
only one possible means of ensuring that a constitution’s restraints will remain in effect. 
Entrenchment makes it harder for those bound by constitutions to dismantle the 
constitutional frameworks designed to restrain them, but the extremely specific policy 
provisions found in most of the world’s less-entrenched constitutions may represent an 
alternative strategy to achieve this same end.  
Specificity may substitute for entrenchment as a constitutional mechanism to 
constrain government. In the language of the principal-agent model, specific 
constitutional directives deprive the agent of discretion, leaving it with little room to 
abuse the principal’s delegation of power.  By increasing the scope of these constitutional 
mandates (i.e. including mandates on a wider array of policy issues) the principal can 
dictate exactly which policies its agents must enact and which they must refrain from 
enacting in manifold areas of governance. On this model, constitutions allow people to 
control their governments, not by establishing spare limitations through exceedingly rare 
(and rarefied) processes and making sure that those frameworks endure, but through 
constitutional micromanagement, specifying directly in the constitution how government 
should proceed. 
This process generally requires the frequent delivery of detailed instructions and 
corrections to the organs of government through the vehicle of constitutional law.  It 
permits democratic majorities to clarify their preferred applications of the constitution’s 
majestic and broadly phrased principles and standards, and allows majorities to correct 
policies they see as mistaken, or even unconstitutional, by placing corrective provisions 
directly into the constitution. 
Such specific constitutional policies require the un-entrenchment of constitutions. 
Writing a highly specific document likely entails substantial negotiation costs; different 
parties are often unable to agree on all the details of government up front.  Flexibility 
may therefore be necessary to overcome the challenges associated with forging highly 
specific agreements.  The knowledge that the constitution’s meaning can be renegotiated 
on an ongoing basis, if groups come to perceive design flaws and/or circumstances 
change, might help parties to agree upon a detailed policy constitution.  Alternatively, 
even when a constitution’s drafters have not consciously lowered the bar for formal 
amendment, the inclusion of specific policies in a constitutional text may quickly 
necessitate updates to that text as small changes in circumstances require changes to the 
policy details enshrined in constitutions. Frequent amendment and periodic replacement 
may therefore become norms of a constitutional system that employs specificity. 
Specificity and flexibility are mutually reinforcing not only at the birth of a 
constitution, but also throughout its life. The relatively undemanding amendment 
procedures and norms that enable frequent constitutional updating also encourage a 
variety of issue-oriented groups to pursue constitutional change in their efforts to advance 
particular policy goals. As constitutions begin to respond to the demands of these groups, 
other groups follow suit, insisting on the inclusion of a new set of specific policy 
instructions. Since constitutions are strongly path dependent (provisions are commonly 
 8 
added, but rarely taken out), flexible constitutions tend to become increasingly broader in 
scope.  
Of course, flexible constitutions are not only responsive to the demands of citizen 
groups, but are also vulnerable to the very officeholders they purport to control. There 
exists a fine line between the principal adjusting the agent’s marching orders, and the 
agent enshrining its own interests. Around the world, examples abound of leaders 
changing the constitution to serve their own interests.  Authoritarian leaders, for example, 
have sometimes been able to secure an extension of presidential term limits through 
constitutional amendment (Ginsburg et al. 2011). The U.S. states have attempted to solve 
this potential problem by designing revision procedures that require popular involvement.  
Whether revisions come about through constitutional conventions or legislative 
amendments, citizens are always involved. Popular involvement is thus an important 
condition to ensure that it is not the agent itself that changes the constitution to serve its 
own interest. At the national level, popular involvement has not yet reached the same 
unassailable status, although it is increasingly common, and referred to as the new “gold 
standard” in constitutional design (Galligan & Versteeg 2013, 33). In fact, a majority of 
democratic nations now require the constitution to be approved by popular referendum 
(Ginsburg et al. 2009).  
Flexible and specific constitutions reflect a different view of the judiciary from 
that of entrenched frameworks.  They reflect the view that judges themselves can subvert 
a constitution, or that the judiciary is also an agent whose actions must be aligned with 
the interest of the principal. These constitutions attempt to guard against renegade 
judiciaries by providing detailed instructions to judges about how to (and how not to) 
interpret the constitution, and by allowing members of the polity to respond to unpopular 
judicial decisions through constitutional amendments that explicitly overturn unpopular 
rulings. Indeed, it is common for many constitutions to include amendments in direct 
response to unfavorable judicial rulings.  
While judicial enforcement is often portrayed as essential to binding government 
with an entrenched constitution, it is not the only possible method of binding 
government. Although courts may certainly enforce the mandates and prohibitions 
contained in non-entrenched constitutions, their high level of specificity typically renders 
these documents less subject to battles over how to interpret and apply them, making it 
more obvious when government has violated them. It is therefore possible to hold elected 
officials accountable at the polls for these clear violations of their orders, especially in 
cases where elected officials violate recent and popularly-enacted constitutional 
instructions (Zackin 2013). The detailed nature of their provisions, therefore, renders 
these constitutions relatively enforceable without recourse to litigation.  
The constitutional design we have sketched here, and the politics to which it gives 
rise, are dramatically different from the standard theory of constitutional design. These 
constitutions are subject to frequent revision, far more detailed, broader in scope, and 
create a very different role for the judiciary. Rather than view these differences as failings 
of constitutional design, however, we identify a coherent strategy in this design, one 
through which specificity and democratic participation limit government in place of fixed 
constitutional barriers. This design is more majoritarian and participatory, and as such, is 
less likely to secure robust protection to minorities.
 
 It is important to note, therefore, that 
while we argue that the majority of the world’s constitutions are characterized by the 
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alternative design strategy we described here, ours is a descriptive claim only.  We do not 
argue that this design strategy is normatively superior.  
 
4.1. Rigid Frameworks and Flexible Policy Documents: A Unified Scale 
 
Given the alternative model of constitutional politics we have described here, we 
would expect constitutions’ length and flexibility to be highly correlated. Indeed, the 
correlation between the revision rate and the word count of democratic constitutions is 
0.51. It is no surprise then that the world’s longest national democratic constitutionthat 
of India is also the most frequently revised. However, the entrenched framework and 
flexible policy-oriented constitutional models we describe here are ideal types. Even the 
U.S. Constitution contains several detailed policy provisions (take for instance the Third 
Amendment’s guarantee that soldiers will not be quartered in private homes in times of 
peace without their owners’ consent). Rather than placing real constitutions into one of 
these two categories therefore, we believe it is more fruitful to imagine constitutions 
lying along a continuum from entrenched, framework documents on the one side to 
flexible, policy-oriented constitution on the other.   
 
5. Shifting Constitutional Models: From Rigid Frameworks to Flexible Policy 
Documents 
As we demonstrated above most democratic constitutions today are relatively 
flexible and detailed, at least compared with the U.S. Constitution and the constitutional 
theories that emphasize entrenchment. In this section, we demonstrate that entrenched, 
framework constitution is the older model of constitutionalism, and that the flexibility 
and specificity we describe developed over time. This section examines when this shift 
took place and draws on the existing historical literature to describe its political context. 
This context is consistent with the alternative model of constitutionalism we have 
described, in which constitutions are designed to check government through specific and 
changeable provisions rather than entrenched frameworks.  
 First, constitutions have been getting longer. Figure 3 depicts the average length 
of state constitutions and the world’s constitutions over time.  These data actually 
understate the growth of state and national constitutions, since (unlike the data in Figures 
1 and 2) it is based on the length of constitutions at the time of their adoption, that is, it 
omits the impact of amendments. To illustrate, Alabama’s unwieldy constitution was 
30,747 words long when first adopted in 1901, one-tenth of what it is today.  (Its 
amendment establishing the “Forever Wild” program alone was longer than the entire 
federal constitution (Ala. Const. Amend 543 (amended 1992)). Nonetheless, Figure 3 
reveals a strong trend towards longer constitutions, both for states and countries.   
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Figure 3: word count of democratic constitutions at time of their adoption 
 
 
 
 
Second, the rate at which constitutions are revised has increased. In order to 
capture changes over time, we calculate a slightly different version of the revision rate 
introduced in part II. Specifically, we calculate for each democratic polity, in each year, 
the number of revisions the constitutional system has undergone at that point in time, and 
divide it by the total number of years that the polity has been in existence. So this 
revision rate changes from year to year in each polity.  
Figure 4 depicts the average revision rates across all democratic polities; across 
all democratic countries and across all American states. Notably, it shows an upward 
trajectory for each of these groups.  
 
  Figure 4:  Revision rates 
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Contextualizing the Shift:  
We have argued that the changing form of constitutional documents reflects the 
emergence of a new model of constitutionalism, one in which specificity, rather than 
entrenchment, establishes meaningful checks on government. However, an alternative 
interpretation of this shift towards flexible, policy-oriented documents is that 
constitutions become more flexible and policy-oriented when they no longer need to 
constrain the government, and when constitutions no longer need to address the problem 
of agency control or the costs associated with it. Tom Ginsburg and Eric Posner, for 
instance, have argued that subnational constitutions are more flexible and specific than 
national constitutions because subnational polities do not need to exercise as much 
control over their sub-national governments when a national government will fulfill that 
monitoring function. They highlight U.S. State constitutions as an example of this 
phenomenon, arguing that state constitutions are more flexible and specific than the U.S. 
Constitution precisely because the U.S. Constitution and the Federal government can 
keep state governments in check. With the federal government in place to monitor state 
governments, state constitutions have devolved into changeable codes that reflect the 
particularistic and changeable outcomes of interest groups’ bargains (Ginsburg and 
Posner, subconstitutionalism, 1610).  
Ginsburg and Posner offer the increased amendment rate of state constitutions 
after the incorporation of the Bill of Rights as evidence that the flexibility of state 
constitutions was the result of a decreased need for these constitutions to check state 
governments once the Federal courts had assumed responsibility for monitoring them. 
(Ginsburg and Posner, subconstitutionalism, 1608-1610). As part of this analysis, 
Ginsburg and Posner distinguish between total revision through constitutional convention 
and piecemeal amendment, and argue that the decreasing rate of constitutional 
conventions at the state level, coupled with the increasing rate of amendment, is further 
evidence of a shift away from the creation of constitutions that establish meaningful 
monitoring structures toward constitutions that simply enact lower-order policy bargains.  
When we measure constitutional flexibility differently, however, we arrive at a 
very different picture of the timing of this shift toward greater flexibility. As described 
above, individual amendments or groups of amendments can be quite substantively 
important, just as conventions can produce putatively new constitutions that are 
extremely similar to their predecessors. Therefore, we view constitutional changes 
achieved through both piecemeal amendment and wholesale revision as evidence of 
constitutional flexibility. Understood in this way, the states’ constitutional flexibility is 
not a product of the mid-twentieth century, but of the mid-nineteenth. When we examine 
the rates of constitutional revision, rather than simply amendment, it becomes clear that 
state constitutions were changed more and more frequently throughout the second half of 
the nineteenth century (Figure 4). Furthermore, when we combine revision rates with 
state constitutional length (as a measure of their detail), we once again find that state 
constitutions began to grow in length at least a century before the incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights (Figure 3).  
The political context of this nineteenth-century shift away from entrenched, 
framework constitutions is perhaps the most direct evidence that specific constitutions 
did not emerge from a diminished need to supervise and check government power, but 
from the opposite impulse to enhance citizens’ oversight of governing institutions. 
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Indeed, as many scholars of U.S. state constitutions have noted, detailed instructions were 
added to nineteenth-century state constitutions as part of larger nationwide movements to 
enhance popular control over policymaking. The Jacksonians, then Populists, and finally 
Progressives all sought to augment and even replace representative government with new 
mechanisms of direct democracy. These reform projects were, of course, targeted at 
changing far more than state constitutional texts, but they accomplished their aims -- 
including the expansion of the franchise, the move to elect a greater number of governing 
officials, and the adoption of lawmaking through citizen initiative -- in part by securing 
changes to constitutional texts (Tarr 1998). Not only did state constitutions undergo these 
substantive changes, but the practice of constitutionalism itself (i.e. the drafting, 
amendment, and political use of these documents) also came to reflect a new model of 
constitutional governance, one that emphasized governments’ simultaneous corruptibility 
and perfectibility, and used state constitutions as flexible mechanisms to exert direct and 
ongoing control of government officials and the public policies they created. 
 The original impetus to include detailed policy instructions in state constitutions 
is often traced to the economic crisis of 1839, which revealed the enormous fiscal 
blunders that many state legislatures had made, and motivated a wave of constitutional 
change designed to prevent legislatures from repeating these mistakes (Sturm 1982). 
Earlier in the decade, state legislatures had invested heavily in the canals, railroads, and 
banks, and had financed these investments not through taxation, but through 
indebtedness. As long as these investments were financially successful, they allowed 
state governments to profit from the economic boom while simultaneously developing 
their transportation and banking infrastructure, all without requiring them to raise taxes 
(Wallis 20055). However, when the economic boom of the 1830s ended with an equally 
dramatic bust, and these investments proved unprofitable, these schemes resulted in 
disaster. Many heavily indebted states were forced to default on their interest payments, 
while others only narrowly avoided default. These crises triggered widespread calls to 
ensure that legislatures would be permanently barred from this type of boom-time 
policymaking. Between 1842 and 1852, ten of the eleven states that held constitutional 
conventions wrote procedural restrictions on the way that states could issue debt directly 
into their constitutions (Wallis 2005, 219). These restrictions on state indebtedness were 
some of the earliest detailed policy instructions included in state constitutions.   
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, agrarian reformers and 
advocates of organized labor pursued the inclusion of detailed policies for a similar 
purpose: to preempt particular policy choices and to force state governments into 
enacting new slates of popular policies. The Grangers, for instance, used constitutions to 
establish state oversight and regulation of railroad corporations and grain warehouses 
(Tarr 1998, 114-5). In many states, labor unions employed a similar strategy, pursuing 
the insertion of detailed, protective labor regulations directly into constitutional 
documents (Zackin 2013). 
Nineteenth-century observers recognized this shift to policy-oriented 
constitutions, and identified these new documents as attempts to control the organs of 
state government. Indeed, it was obvious to many that a new model of constitutionalism 
was emerging, and by the end of the century, critics of this new form of constitutionalism 
regularly encouraged constitution writers to retain the familiar framework model, and 
leave policymaking to the institutions the framework established. The prominent jurist 
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Thomas Cooley, for instance, admonished the North Dakota Constitutional Convention of 
1889: “You have got to trust somebody in the future, and it is right and proper that each 
department of government should be trusted to perform its legitimate function"(cited in 
Eaton 1892). As we have seen, however, these calls to preserve spare, framework 
constitutionalism went largely unheeded. An 1892 article in the Harvard Law Review 
described newly written state constitutions as products of the pervasive belief that “the 
agents of the people, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are not to be trusted; so 
that it is necessary to enter into the most minute particulars as to what they shall not 
do”(Eaton 1892, 121). Even while the new model of constitutionalism was emerging, it 
was clear that specific policy-oriented constitutions had been designed to allow private 
citizens to exert more control over their governments. 
Detailed policy provisions not only attest to a popular mistrust of legislatures, but 
also reflect the recognition that judges may exert enormous influence over public policy 
and that detailed, policy-oriented constitutions can curtail judicial power as well as 
legislative discretion. This is particularly true beginning at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, as it seemed increasingly apparent to progressives both within and outside the 
legal academy that judges were not neutral monitors, overseeing government officials on 
behalf of those they represented, but were themselves consequential policymakers. 
Progressive reformers realized that detailed constitutional provisions could check judicial 
power over the policymaking process by explicitly identifying particular policies as 
constitutionally permissible. As John Dinan has demonstrated, Progressive-Era 
opposition to judicial policymaking resulted in a wave of court-constraining 
constitutional provisions, designed to prevent state courts from invalidating legislation on 
subjects related to maximum working hours, minimum wages, collective bargaining, 
workers’ compensation, and other social welfare programs (Dinan 2007). This wave of 
constitutional changes to add policy details developed not as a relaxation of the on 
government, but on the contrary, as an alternative model of constitutionalism—one in 
which specificity and frequent, democratic revision replaced entrenchment as a means of 
subordinating government to popular control exercised through referenda and elections.  
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